Abstract. Traffic flow is modeled by a conservation law describing the density of cars. It is assumed that each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of a departure and an arrival cost. There are N groups of drivers, The i-th group consists of κi drivers, sharing the same departure and arrival costs ϕi(t), ψi(t). For any given population sizes κ1, . . . , κn, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution, where no driver can lower his own total cost by choosing a different departure time. The possible non-uniqueness, and a characterization of this Nash equilibrium solution, are also discussed.
Introduction
Consider a model of traffic flow where n groups of drivers travel along a freeway, from a location A (say, a residential neighborhood) to a location B (the city center). Each driver seeks to optimize his departure time, given a cost for starting early, and a cost for arriving late. Different groups have different departure and arrival costs. For example, there may be three groups: drivers in the first group need to arrive at destination by 8:00 am., those in the second group need to arrive by 9:00 am., while drivers in the third group can arrive at any time between 9:00 and 12:00, and simply wish to minimize the time spent on the road.
Following the classical papers [13, 14] , traffic flow will be modeled by the conservation law
The main features of the general case n ≥ 2, and the new results proved in the present paper, can be summarized as follows.
• A solution to the traffic flow problem with n groups of drivers can be determined by assigning a scalar density ρ = ρ(t, x), satisfying the conservation law (1.1), together with a "prioritizing function". Among the first β drivers who have departed within a given time t, this function specifies how many belong to the first group, how many to the second group, etc.; • for any n-tuple of costs c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ), there exists at least one Nash equilibrium solution where all drivers of the i-th group share the same total cost c i . The corresponding density function ρ in (1.1) is uniquely determined by c. However, for the same n-tuple of costs (c 1 , . . . , c n ), there can be several different decompositions ρ = ρ 1 + · · · + ρ n , yielding different Nash equilibria. In general, the map c → κ(c) . = (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ); κ i . = ρ i (t, x) dx is the the total number of i-drivers in some Nash solution with costs (c 1 , . . . , c n )
is a multivalued function. On the other hand, the map c → κ 1 + · · · + κ n is always single valued; • the multifunction c → κ(c) ⊂ R n in (1.2) has closed graph and nonempty, compact, convex values. Relying on Cellina's approximate selection theorem [3] , a topological argument shows that c∈R n κ(c) = R n + . Otherwise stated, for every n-tuple (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ) with κ i ≥ 0 for each i, there exists a vector c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) of costs and a Nash equilibrium solution where the total number of drivers of the i-th group is κ i and each i-driver pays the same total cost c i . When n ≥ 2 this solution may not be unique.
In our model, x ∈ [0, R] is the space variable, describing a point along the road. A solution of (1.1) is determined by assigning the incoming flow ρ(0, t) v(ρ(0, t)) =ū(t) (1.3) at the entrance of the freeway. As remarked in [2] , it is more convenient to switch the roles of the independent variables t, x, and rewrite the boundary value problem (1.1), (1.3) as a Cauchy problem for the flux of cars u = ρv(ρ), namely u x + f (u) t = 0, u (t, 0) =ū(t). (1.4) Here u → f (u) = ρ is defined as a partial inverse of the map ρ → ρ v(ρ) = u, as in Figure 1 . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we clarify all the assumptions and state the main result. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of Nash equilibria for a given vector of costs (c 1 , . . . , c n ), while in Section 4 we prove the existence of an equilibrium solution for given population sizes (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ).
For a general introduction to scalar conservation laws and the Lax formula we refer to [11, 12, 15] . A short introduction to control theory and Hamilton-Jacobi equations can be found in [4] . All the basic results on setvalued functions, including Cellina's approximate selection theorem, can be found in [1] . Various optimization problems for traffic flow, based on the Lighthill-Whitham conservation law model, have been considered in [7] [8] [9] [10] . For an introduction to differential games and for recent applications to traffic flow on networks we refer to [5] and [6] , respectively.
Statement of the main results
Consider the conservation law
In our traffic model, after interchanging the roles of the variables, x will denote time while t ∈ [0, T ] describes points along a highway of total length T . The dependent variable u = u(t, x) denotes the traffic flow at time x across the point t on the highway. In the Lighthill-Whitham model one has u = ρv(ρ), where ρ is the density of cars while v(ρ) is the speed of cars (see Fig. 1 ). The function u → f (u) = ρ is obtained by inverting the
, we extend f to a function f : R → R ∪ {+∞}, by setting (see Fig. 1 )
Introducing the integral function
3) the conservation law (2.1) can be equivalently written as a Hamilton-Jacobi equation
Throughout the following, f denotes the flux function extended to the entire real line as in (2.2), while
is the Legendre transform of f . In our model, U (t, x) describes the total number of cars that have crossed the point t along the highway during the time interval ] − ∞, x].
As initial data we shall consider any non-decreasing, function Q : R → R + , with
Here Q(x) describes the total number of drivers that have initiated their journey (possibly joining a queue at the entrance of the highway, if there is any) at time ≤ x. Notice that Q is continuous except for countably many times x. To fix the ideas, we shall consider the leftcontinuous version where Q(x) = Q(x−) coincides with its left limit at every x. When needed, we shall denote by Q(x+) = lim y→x+ Q(y) the right limit of Q at x.
For a given Q(·), consider the Lipschitz continuous function
The difference Q(x) − U(x) can be interpreted as the length of the queue at the entrance of the highway at time x, while U (x) denotes the total number of drivers that have actually departed (after clearing the queue) up to time x. For t > 0, the entropy-admissible solution to the Cauchy problem (2.4), (2.7) is provided by the Lax formula:
Observe that the last two expressions in (2.8) are equal because (f * ) (p) ≤ M for all p, and (f
As in [2] , we consider a cost ϕ(x) for early departure and a cost ψ(x) for late arrival. The basic assumptions will be: 
(A2) The cost functionals ϕ, ψ are locally Lipschitz continuous and satisfy
(2.10)
According to (A2), the cost for early departure is decreasing in time, while cost for late arrival is increasing. The assumption that these costs tend to infinity as t → ±∞ coincides with common sense and guarantees that in an equilibrium solution the departure rate is compactly supported. Given an initial data Q(·) as in (2.6), for β ∈ [0, κ[ we define the points x q (β), x d (β), and x a (β) by setting
In the application to traffic flow, β is a Lagrangian variable labeling a particular driver. In this case, x q (β) accounts for the time where this driver joins the queue, x d (β) is the actual departure time and x a (β) is the arrival time. We observe that, for all except countably many β, the points x q (β) and x a (β) are uniquely determined by the relations
12)
It will be convenient to introduce the function
where f * is the Legendre transform of f , as in (2.5). For a.e. β the arrival time x a (β) can also be characterized as
Defining the constant 
In connection with the traffic model, condition (i) states that all drivers bear the same cost c. Condition (ii) says that, regardless of the starting time x, no one can achieve a cost < c.
Next, assume that there are different groups of drivers that need to reach destination at different times. For i = 1, . . . , n we thus consider cost functions ϕ i (x), ψ i (x), all satisfying the assumptions (A2). We seek Nash equilibrium solutions in this more general situation.
Let Q 1 (·), . . . , Q n (·) describe the departure distributions of the various groups of drivers. In other words, Q i (x) is the total number of drivers of the i-th group that have started their journey (possibly joining the queue at the entrance of the highway) within time x. We assume that all these functions are left continuous and non-decreasing, with
For i = 1, . . . , n, the value κ i ≥ 0 accounts for the total number of drivers of the i-th group. We will define a solution (U 1 , . . . , U n )(t, x) to the traffic flow problem, corresponding to the above departure pattern. Here U i (t, x) describes the total number of drivers of the i-th group that have crossed the point t on the highway within time x. Setting 
4) with initial data Q(·).
This implies that the function U is uniquely determined by the Lax formula (2.8). In general, however, that this is not enough to uniquely determine the components U i . For example, if Q i and Q j both have a jump at x = x 0 , this means that at the same instant of time x 0 a positive amount of drivers join the queue, both from the i-th and from the j-th group. Different solutions can then be obtained, depending on the priority that we assign to drivers in each group. To resolve this issue, we consider a family of nondecreasing functions
with the following properties: 
On the other hand, if Q(x) < β ≤ Q(x+), we define
It is now easy to check that both conditions (2.21)-(2.22) are satisfied.
Given an initial data Q(·) as in (2.6) and the prioritizing functions (2.20 ) are now uniquely determined by the formulas
Here, for t > 0,
is the solution of (2.4) with initial data Q(·), computed by the Lax formula.
We wish to introduce a concept of Nash equilibrium solution, extending Definition 2.1 to the case of several groups of drivers with different costs. Toward this goal, we first need to determine the starting time (possibly joining the queue at the entrance of the highway) and the arrival time of each driver in the i-th group. Let ζ ∈ [0, κ i ] label this particular driver. We then define
(2.25)
Notice that, for all but countably many ζ, these values are uniquely determined by the relations 
Here x → A(x) is the function in (2.16), describing the arrival time of a driver starting at time x. According to (i), every driver of the i-th group pays the same cost c i , while by (ii) he cannot decrease this cost by choosing any other starting time. We can now state our main result of existence of Nash equilibria. 
Nash equilibria with given costs
As a first step toward the proof of Theorem 2.4, given constants c 1 , . . . , c n , in this section we construct a Nash equilibrium solution where all drivers of the i-th group pay the same cost c i .
Let x → Λ i (x) be the map implicitly defined by
In other words, if an i-driver arrives at destination at time x, in order to pay a total cost c i he must depart at time Λ i (x). The assumption (A2) implies that the maps Λ i : R → R are well defined, locally Lipschitz continuous, and nondecreasing. We now consider an auxiliary problem where all drivers have the same starting and arrival costs, namely Proof. In the case all drivers have the same starting and arrival costs, under the assumptions (A1)-(A2) the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution were established by Theorem 3 in [2] . We remark that the functions ϕ, ψ in (3.2) may not satisfy all the assumptions stated in (A2). However, all the arguments used in the original proof in [2] remain valid. Indeed,
• since every map x → Λ i (x) is locally Lipschitz continuous and nondecreasing, the same is true for the map ψ in (3.2); • since the Nash equilibrium is not affected if we add a constant to the cost functions, in the proof of the existence theorem, the condition ψ ≥ 0 can be easily replaced by the assumption ψ is bounded below.
To establish a lower bound on ψ = min i {Λ i (x)} we proceed as follows. If Λ i (x)) ≤ 0, from the inequalities
we deduce
• in the proof of Theorem 3, the assumption lim x→+∞ (ϕ(x) + ψ(x)) = +∞ is only used to show that all departures must occur within some a-priori bounded interval of time. Therefore, all the arguments in the proof remain valid if we can show that there exists an interval [a, b] such that
If all couples (ϕ i , ψ i ) satisfy the assumptions (A2), we can choose a as in (3.4). We then choose b > a large enough so that ϕ i (x) + ψ i (x) ≥ c i for all x > b. This yields (3.5).
We recall that initial data for the Nash equilibrium solution admits the representation
where Q 0 is the family of all nondecreasing maps Q(·) as in (2.6), such that the corresponding solution U in (2.8), (2.11) satisfies
Otherwise stated, Q should be the initial data for a solution U of (2.4) where a.e. driver has a total cost ≤ 0.
Next, let U = U (t, x) be the unique Nash equilibrium solution of (2.4) with costs (3.2). We will show that every Nash equilibrium solution of the problem for several groups of drivers with costs ϕ i , ψ i can be obtained as follows. Consider the unit simplex
Let Θ be the family of all measurable maps 
This clearly yields Proof.
Theorem 3.2. Let the flux function f satisfy (A1), and assume that each pair of cost functions
(ϕ i , ψ i ), i = 1, . .
. , n satisfies (A2). Let U = U (t, x) be the unique Nash solution constructed in Lemma 3.1, with initial data Q(·), and let Θ be the set of all measurable maps θ : R → Δ satisfying (3.8). Then the following holds. (i) For every θ ∈ Θ, the initial data Q(·) together with the prioritizing functions B

1.
To prove (i), fix any θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ {1, . . . n}. Since the functions
are all continuous and non-decreasing, for all but countably many ζ ∈ [0, κ The above uniqueness properties together yield 
The above uniqueness properties together yield
3. We claim that, if ζ ∈ [0, κ j ] is a value for which all the uniqueness assumptions in the previous two steps hold, then
. By continuity there exists ε > 0 such that
By (3.8) and (3.9), no driver of the j-th group arrives during the time interval I ε . Hence U j (T, ·) is constant on this interval. For all y ∈ I ε we thus have
In this case, every point y ∈ I ε provides a solution to the equation U θ j (T, y) = ζ. This contradicts the uniqueness assumption on the solution of (3.10). Hence (3.16) must hold. Since the uniqueness assumptions stated in the previous steps hold for all but countably many values of ζ, we conclude that (3.16) is satisfied for a.e. ζ ∈ [0, κ i ], 
From the identities (3.12)-(3.15) it now follows
This proves (2.27).
5.
We now prove (2.28). Assume that, on the contrary, there exists x ∈ R and an index j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Since ϕ j is monotone decreasing, this implies x > Λ j A(x) . Then
This contradicts to the fact that U (t, x) provides a solution to the Nash equilibrium problem with a single population of drivers and costs ϕ and ψ as in (3.2). Hence (2.28) must hold.
6.
In the remaining steps we prove part (ii) of the theorem. Assume that the initial distribution Q together with the prioritizing function B = ( B 1 , . . . , B n ) provide a Nash equilibrium solution. We begin by proving that Q(·) = Q(·). For this purpose, it suffices to prove that Q(·) satisfies (2.17) and (2.18), with c = 0 and costs ϕ, ψ given by (3.2). The identity Q = Q will then follow from the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution for a single group of drivers.
Let U = U (t, x) be the solution of (2.4) with initial data Q, and fix an index j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since are uniquely determined by the identities
and satisfy
Since Q, B yield a Nash equilibrium, by (2.27) and (3.1) it follows that
Next, we claim that for this particular value of β one has
Indeed, assume that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with Λ k x a (β) < Λ j x a (β) . Since the cost function ϕ k is continuous and strictly decreasing, choosing a starting time Λ k (x a (β)) < y <x q (β) we achieve
Therefore, the total cost to a k-driver starting at time y is
This yields a contradiction with (2.28), proving our claim.
7.
We can now prove that the initial distribution Q yields a Nash solution to the problem with costs ϕ, ψ as in (3.2). Since the maps B i are non-decreasing and B 1 (β) + · · · + B n (β) = β for all β ∈ [0,κ], for a.e. β one can find an index j such that ζ = B j (β) satisfies the conditions in the previous step. In this case, we havẽ
Recalling that ϕ(x) = −x, for a.e. β ∈ [0,κ] we thus have
Hence (2.17) is satisfied. Finally, to show (2.18), assume by contradiction that there exists
Choose an index j such that
. Since ϕ j is strictly decreasing, one has
This completes the proof that Q yields a Nash solution, in connection with the cost functions ϕ, ψ in (3.2). By the uniqueness of the Nash solution, we conclude that Q(·) = Q(·). 
we have
We now define the measurable function
and choosing θ(x) ∈ Δ n arbitrarily, subject only to the condition (3.8), when x / ∈ X(J). For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and every β ∈ J using (3.20) we obtain
Since 
Nash equilibria with given population sizes
Assume that Q(·) together with the prioritizing function B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) yields a Nash equilibrium. Let κ . = Q(+∞) be the total number of drivers. The size of the i-th group of drivers is then κ i = B i (κ) For a given vector c ∈ R n , let K(c) ⊂ R n denote the set of all n-tuples (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ) which correspond to some Nash solution with costs c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) . Our eventual goal is to construct a Nash equilibrium solution for a given n- tuple (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ) describing the sizes of the various groups of drivers. This will be achieved by showing that the multifunction c → K(c) is onto, i.e.
The next lemma provides a key step in this direction. 
Proof.
1. We first show that the multifunction has compact convex values. Fix c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) and let U (t, x) be the unique Nash solution with costs ϕ, ψ as in (3.2), constructed in Lemma 3.1. By Theorem 3.2, we have the following characterization:
. . , κ n ) defined by the integral in (4.1) is a continuous linear operator from L 1 (R; R n ) into R n . The operator K is trivially compact, because the range is finite dimensional. Since the domain Θ defined at (3.8) is a closed convex, bounded subset of L 1 (R; R n ), we conclude that its image K(c) = K(Θ) is a compact, convex subset of R n . Of course, this implies
To prove that the map
We need to show that there exists a Nash equilibrium solution with costsc = (c 1 , . . . ,c n ) and total population sizes (κ 1 , . . . ,κ n ). By (2.21), all maps B Observe that this construction yields
With obvious meaning of notation, we also consider the departure and arrival times
Since all these functions are bounded and monotone, by possibly taking a further subsequence we can assume the pointwise convergence β
From the identities
, letting ν → ∞ and using the continuity of ϕ i , ψ i we conclude
Hence (2.27) holds.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that
where A is the arrival map corresponding to the departure distribution Q:
If (4.2) fails, by continuity we can find y ∈ R and δ > 0 such that
We now consider the arrival maps
x a,ν (β) (4.5) and observe that lim sup
From the inequalities
, letting ν → ∞ and using (4.6), since ϕ i ≤ 0 while ψ i ≥ 0, we conclude
This yields a contradiction with (4.4), completing the proof.
In order to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions to the traffic problem with given population sizesκ = (κ 1 , . . . ,κ n ), we shall use a topological argument, based on Bruwer's fix point theorem.
In the following, we denote by {e 1 , . . . , e n } the standard basis in R n , and let
be the unit simplex in R n . Moreover, we consider the vector 
. . , c n ) and one of the costs satisfies
Proof.
(i) In view of assumption (A2), γ 0 is well defined real number. Since any driver starting at time x must arrive at some time A(x) > x, the total cost to a driver of the j-th group satisfies the inequality
Since no j-driver can achieve a cost ≤ c j , the total number of j-drivers must be zero.
(ii) Letũ be any solution to the conservation law (2.1) with total mass ũ(t, x) dx = M and having compact support, say, contained in the domain [0, T ] × [a, b]. We claim that (4.10) is satisfied by choosing the constant C M ≥ 0 large enough so that 
In view of Theorem 3.2, it suffices to prove that the Nash solution U * , for a single group of drivers with cost functions ϕ, ψ as in (3.2) and total cost zero, contains a total number of drivers ≥ M .
We observe that, in the above solution with densityũ(t, x), every driver departs and arrives at some times
, and pays a total cost Therefore, the integral function
(0, y) dy is contained in the family Q 0 of all departure distributions where each driver bears a total cost ≤ 0.
Calling Q * (·) the initial data for the Nash solution, the representation (3.6) now yields
Proof of Theorem 2.4
With the aid of the previous lemmas, we can now give a proof of Theorem 2.4. Clearly, it suffices to prove that the upper semicontinuous, compact convex valued multifunction c → K(c) ⊂ R n + is surjective, namely We shall argue by contradiction. Assume that, for some vectorκ = (κ 1 , . . . ,κ n ) ∈ R n + is not contained in the left hand side of (4.13). It is not restrictive to assume thatκ i > 0 for every i. Indeed, in the general case we can simply take c j = γ 0 for every index j such thatκ j = 0, and consider a lower dimensional problem.
1. Using Lemma 4.2, fix any M > iκ i and choose C M so that (4.10) holds. We then choose γ < γ 0 and C > C M − γ 0 . Consider the two n-dimensional simplexes (see Fig. 2 We now consider the continuous map h : Δ * → R n , defined as follows.
• If κ ∈ Δ inner , we define h(κ) .
outer , then there exists a unique point p ∈ ∂Δ * and a unique value θ ∈ [0, 1] such that
In this case, we define h(κ) .
6. Let π * the radial projection onto ∂Δ * along rays centered atκ. More precisely, for x =κ, define π * (x) as the unique intersection of the ray {κ + λ(x −κ); λ > 0} with the boundary ∂Δ * . By the analysis in step 4, the image h(Δ * ) does not intersect the ball B(κ, r/2). Therefore, the composition κ → π * • h(κ) is a continuous map from the compact simplex Δ * onto its boundary, such that
According to Brouwer's theorem, such a continuous retraction does not exist. This contradiction proves our theorem While the map c → κ(c) is generally multivalued, it seems reasonable to expect that a partial uniqueness result should hold for the inverse map κ → c. This leads to the following conjecture: If κ i > 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then there exists a unique n-tuple c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) such that (κ 1 , . . . , κ n ) ∈ κ(c). In the special case n = 1, the validity of this conjecture was proved in [2] .
